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An Ounce of Pretrial Prevention Is
Worth More Than a Pound of PostConviction Cure: Untethering Federal
Pretrial Criminal Procedure From Due
Process Standards of Review
Jordan Gross*
ABSTRACT
Some Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure cover purely
technical matters. Some Rules, however, cover procedures with
constitutional dimensions. When a federal court is interpreting a Rule
that has a companion constitutional doctrine, an issue arises as to
whether the Rule’s requirements are co-extensive with the constitutional
protections defined by federal case law, or whether the Rule provides
federal defendants a higher level of pretrial procedural protection than a
post-conviction due process standard. Federal courts have been
inconsistent in identifying and resolving this question of constitutional
equivalency. In interpreting some pretrial Criminal Rules, federal courts
make a clear distinction between the showing required to obtain relief
under the Criminal Rules, on one hand, and the showing required to
obtain relief under constitutional post-conviction standards, on the other.
By interpreting them through other pretrial Criminal Rules, federal
courts have interpreted the showing required to obtain relief under them
to be co-extensive with constitutional post-conviction due process
standards.
Where the interpretation of a Rule is driven by a post-conviction
constitutional jurisprudence, this article argues that pretrial relief for
federal defendants may be unnecessarily and unjustifiably defined and
constrained by constitutional due process minimums. On the contrary, at
the pretrial stage, an accused is presumed innocent, the trial court is in a
unique position to prevent error, and systemic interests in preserving
*
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convictions after the government has obtained a conviction are not
present. In this context, these factors, this article argues, should dictate a
far less demanding standard for obtaining relief pretrial under the
Criminal Rules than the showing required of an offender seeking postconviction relief. This article considers two frequently litigated federal
pretrial procedures that co-exist with a constitutional doctrine developed
in the post-conviction review context – pretrial discovery and change of
venue based on local prejudice – to illustrate federal courts’ inconsistent
approaches to the question of whether pretrial relief under the Rules
should be analyzed independently from constitutional standards
developed in the post-conviction review context.
Part I provides a background discussion of the history of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Part II analyzes the text and
federal case law governing Rules 16 and 21, the two specific federal
provisions examined by this article, and their companion federal
constitutional doctrines. Part III explains how federal courts’ application
of constitutional post-conviction standards to federal pretrial motions is
both analytically unsound and unnecessary. The article argues that there
is no jurisprudential or statutory basis for assuming that federal courts
should interpret the Rules to codify only a minimum due process
standard, and concludes that unless the plain language of a particular
Rule indicates that Congress intended federal defendants to be afforded
no more than the minimal constitutional protections developed in the
post-conviction review context, federal courts are precluded from
applying post-conviction standards of review to resolve pretrial requests
for procedural relief under the Rules.
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“The prosecutor cannot be permitted to look at the case pretrial
through the end of the telescope an appellate court would use post-trial.
Thus, the government must always produce any potentially exculpatory
or otherwise favorable evidence without regard to how the withholding
of such evidence might be viewed-with the benefit of hindsight-as
affecting the outcome of the trial.”
United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005).
“[The federal change of venue rule] is preventative. It is
anticipatory. It is not solely curative as is a post-conviction
constitutional attack. Thus, the rule evokes foresight, always a more
precious gift than hindsight, and for this reason the same certainty
which warrants the reversal of a conviction will not always accompany
the change of venue.”
United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 513 (E.D. La.
1968).
INTRODUCTION
In 1944, against the backdrop of an inconsistent body of
common law and patchwork legislation governing trials in federal
courts, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(“Criminal Rules”) to formalize and standardize trial process and
procedure in the federal courts.1 The Advisory Committee Notes that
accompany the Criminal Rules provide some interpretive guidance for
individual Rules. But the task of interpreting the Criminal Rules has
largely been left to the federal courts.2 Some aspects of the Criminal

1

See George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE
L.J. 694, 700 (1946) (“[Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,] federal criminal procedure could fairly be described as chaotic. Some
matters were governed by piecemeal legislation, enacted at different times, and without
apparent effort to achieve an integrated, cohesive system. As to other matters, common
law prevailed; in the areas subject to the conformity principle, federal procedure looked
to the common law as modified by the constitutions, statutes, and decisions of the
courts of the states.”).
2
See 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, PETER J. HENNING & SARAH
N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32 (4th ed. 2008) (footnotes and
internal citations omitted) (“When each Rule was enacted, and each time the Rules are
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Rules cover purely technical aspects of federal criminal procedure, such
as recording requirements for preliminary hearings,3 and the length of
time for which a grand jury may be constituted.4 Some Criminal Rules,
however, address procedures that have substantive, and even
constitutional dimensions. Examples include the probable cause
requirement for issuance of an arrest warrant,5 and the requirement that
the defendant be present at certain pretrial proceedings, at trial, and at
sentencing.6 As a result, federal courts’ interpretation of the Criminal
Rules may be constrained or informed by constitutional doctrines and
requirements. Where this is the case, federal courts’ interpretation of a
Criminal Rule may be driven by federal constitutional common law in
addition to a Criminal Rule’s text and accompanying Advisory
Committee Notes.
The Criminal Rules and federal courts’ interpretation of them, of
course, apply only to federal, not state, court proceedings because
authority to enact criminal procedural rules and laws governing state
court proceedings is reserved to the individual states. The authority of
individual states, however, is not limitless; all state criminal statutes,

amended, the Advisory Committee publishes Notes of its reasoning in adopting the
change and its intended meaning. The Advisory Committee Notes can be helpful to
courts and lawyers seeking to interpret the Rules, but have no independent precedential
force. The Notes . . . ‘have no official sanction and are intended merely as suggestions
and guides.’”).
3
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(g) (“[P]reliminary hearing must be recorded by a court
reporter or by a suitable recording device. A recording of the proceeding may be made
available to any party upon request. A copy of the recording and a transcript may be
provided to any party upon request and upon any [required] payment . . . .”).
4
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g) (“A grand jury must serve until the court discharges it, but
it may serve more than 18 months only if the court, having determined that an extension
is in the public interest, extends the grand jury’s service. An extension may be granted
for no more than 6 months, except as otherwise provided by statute.”).
5
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (“If the complaint or one or more of affidavits filed with
the complaint establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant . . . .”); id.
advisory committee’s note (“The rule states the existing law relating to warrants issued
by commissioner or other magistrate.” (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
6
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (requiring that, unless provided otherwise under the
Criminal Rules, a defendant be present at the initial appearance, the initial arraignment,
the plea, every trial stage and at sentencing); id. advisory committee’s note (“The first
sentence of the rule setting forth the necessity of the defendant’s presence at
arraignment and trial is a restatement of existing law.” (citing Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370 (1892), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912))).
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rules and procedures must still meet minimum federal due process
guarantees under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.7 The
vast majority of criminal offenses in the United States are prosecuted by
states, not by the federal government.8 However, because those
proceedings must meet minimum federal constitutional protections, an
extensive body of federal constitutional criminal procedural
jurisprudence has evolved in the context of federal court review of state
court convictions.9 In contrast, comparatively few criminal offenses are
prosecuted by the federal government. As a result, the bulk of federal
constitutional criminal procedural law is focused on locating the federal
constitutional due process floor that criminal court procedures must
meet.10
When a federal court is interpreting or applying a federal

7

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the United States Constitution, federal
statutes, and Treaties are “the supreme law of the land”).
8
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011 193,
195 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/law.pdf (“The
bulk of civil and criminal litigation in the [United States] is commenced and determined
in the various state courts. Only when the U.S. Constitution and acts of Congress
specifically confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts may civil or criminal litigation
be heard and decided by them.”).
9
See Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue:
The Increased Importance under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State
Courts, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 242-43 (2008) (footnote omitted) (“Because the
vast majority of criminal cases in the U.S. are prosecuted in state courts, certain kinds
of important federal constitutional issues may arise more frequently-or nearly
exclusively-in state court criminal proceedings.”); see also Jordan Steiker,
Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State
Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. Chi. Legal
F. 315, 323-24 (footnotes and citations omitted) (“In its landmark 1953 decision, Brown
v. Allen, the Supreme Court confirmed what a half-century of practice had increasingly
made clear: federal habeas would generally provide a forum for de novo review of state
decisions rejecting the federal constitutional claims of state prisoners. Over the next two
decades, the scope and significance of the habeas forum expanded dramatically. As the
Court enlarged the federal constitutional rights of state criminal defendants by
extending Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment protections to state proceedings
via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the grounds for federal habeas
relief radically broadened.”).
10
Steiker, supra note 9, at 342 (“[T]he range of constitutional claims available to state
prisoners increased dramatically in the 1950s and 1960s. The simultaneous expansion
of the federal writ and federal constitutional rights thus led to increased federal
supervision
of
state
criminal
processes.”).
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Criminal Rule that has a companion constitutional doctrine, a question
may arise as to whether the Rule’s requirements are co-extensive with
the constitutional protections defined by federal case law, or whether the
Rule provides federal defendants a higher level of pretrial procedural
protection than a post-conviction due process standard. Federal courts
have been inconsistent in identifying and resolving this question of
constitutional equivalency. In interpreting some pretrial Criminal Rules,
federal courts make a clear distinction between the showing required to
obtain relief under the Criminal Rules, on one hand, and the showing
required to obtain relief under constitutional post-conviction standards,
on the other. In interpreting with other pretrial Criminal Rules, federal
courts have interpreted the showing required to obtain relief under them
to be co-extensive with constitutional post-conviction due process
standards.
This article argues that where the interpretation of a Criminal
Rule is driven by a post-conviction constitutional jurisprudence, pretrial
relief for federal defendants may be unnecessarily and unjustifiably
defined and constrained by constitutional due process minimums. To
illustrate, this article considers two frequently litigated pretrial
procedures that co-exist with a constitutional doctrine developed in the
post-conviction review context. The first procedure examined is federal
pretrial discovery. Most federal discovery is subject to a limitation that
only requires the government to produce items that are “material” to the
defense. This article examines the development of two different
definitions of the term “material” federal trial courts apply to pretrial
discovery requests, depending on whether a defendant requests
discovery under the Criminal Rules, or under the Fifth Amendment. The
second procedure examined is change of venue based on local prejudice.
With respect to federal change of venue procedure, federal courts have
proven unable collectively to resolve whether a federal defendant’s
change of venue motion under the Criminal Rules should be analyzed
independently from the constitutional standard developed in the postconviction review context.
Part I of this article provides a background discussion of the
history and purpose of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Part II
analyzes the text, history and purpose of Rule 16 and Rule 21, the two
specific federal rules examined in this article, along with their
companion federal constitutional doctrines. Part III examines how
federal courts’ application of constitutional post-conviction standards to
federal pretrial motions is both analytically unsound and unnecessary.
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This article argues that there is no jurisprudential or statutory basis for
assuming that federal courts should interpret the Criminal Rules to
codify only minimum due process standards. On the contrary, at the
pretrial stage, where an accused is presumed innocent, the trial court is
in a unique position to prevent error, and systemic interests in protecting
convictions and appellate court deference to the trial courts postconviction are not present, normative, jurisprudential, and due process
interests should compel a very different understanding of pretrial
Criminal Rules. In the pretrial context, these considerations, as a
minimum, should translate into a far less demanding and far more
preventative standard for obtaining relief pretrial under the Criminal
Rules than a due process constitutional minimum standard applicable to
an offender seeking post-conviction relief on review. This article
concludes that unless the plain language or statutory history of a
particular Criminal Rule indicates that Congress intended federal
defendants to be afforded no more than the minimal constitutional
protections developed in the post-conviction review context, federal
courts are precluded from applying post-conviction standards of review
to resolve pretrial requests for procedural relief under the Criminal
Rules.
I. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure – Background and
Interpretive History
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1944 following the successful implementation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.11 Before Congress enacted the Criminal Rules, federal
11

Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin, Preface to 1 Drafting History of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Including Comments, Recommendations, and
Suggestions on Drafts of the Rules, at xi (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds.,
1991) (footnotes omitted) (“In 1943, Congress gave the Supreme Court the power to
make rules with respect to civil actions and to make uniform the procedures to be used
both in cases of equity and in actions at law. The ensuing Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . were generally well received and there were many who believed that the
various criminal rules in use in the District Courts should be made uniform as well.
Consequently, Congress granted the Supreme Court the power to make rules of
procedure for criminal cases . . . .”). The Supreme Court appointed an Advisory
Committee, which published its Preliminary Drafts for comment in 1943 and 1944. Id.
at xiii-xiv. The Rules became effective on March 21, 1946. Id. at xv; see also Nathan E.
Ross, The Nearly Forgotten Supervisory Power: The Wrench to Retaining the Miranda
Warnings, 66 MO. L. REV. 849, 862 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“Congress authorized
the Court to develop Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . to replace the prior federal
laws that provided little coherence and fostered confusion. Satisfied with the Federal
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criminal procedure consisted of a scattered collection of rules derived
from various sources lacking any cohesion or internal consistency.12
After the Rules became effective, the Advisory Committee created a set
of Advisory Notes for the Criminal Rules to provide guidance to courts
and practitioners.13 The Advisory Notes indicate that, like the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Criminal Rules codified and formalized
some pretrial procedures in federal courts. In other instances, the
Criminal Rules explicitly rejected and departed from existing procedures
and customs.14 In some cases, the Advisory Notes provide the
Committee’s view on how court should interpret and apply particular
provisions.15
The Criminal Rules are at once constitutionally-based and yet
not constitutionally-constrained. As with all statutes and procedural
rules, both state and federal, the Criminal Rules must meet a federal
constitutional floor and ensure the basic level of federal due process
protections guaranteed to all defendants. And, like all state and federal
statutes and procedural rules, the Criminal Rules can exceed the

Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress also authorized the Court to promulgate Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”).
12
See Wendell Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42 MICH.
L. REV. 353, 353 (1943) (“On numerous questions the practice of various districts and
circuits is in conflict. Existing legislation is fragmentary, and has not been periodically
revised in any systematic way to conform to experience.”).
13
Wilken & Triffin, supra note 11, at xv-xvi (“Undaunted, or impelled by its own
momentum, the Committee continued to labor on one last project: a set of notes to the
Rules ‘to indicate . . . which provisions of the Rules are restatements of existing law, to
define the extent of any changes, and to the extent that any of these Rules involve
innovations, to ascertain their background and source.’” (citing U.S. GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE, Notes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of
the United States, at IX (1945))).
14
Dession, supra note 1, at 699 (“The rules work no revolutionary reforms. Some
restate existing law. Others involve substantial changes. By and large those changes
consist in adoption of modern practices developed in the more progressive states and in
England. A few are new. The prime values sought to be served throughout were, as
declared in Rule 2, ‘simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.’” (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 2)).
15
See 8A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 22:3 (2013) (“In the absence of
a clear legislative mandate, the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide a reliable source of insight into the meaning of a Rule of
Criminal Procedure. While the Notes are not authoritative, they are somewhat
analogous to congressional committee reports in determining the intention of the
framers of the rules.” (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 64 n.6 (2002); United
States v. Mihalopoulos, 228 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.D.C. 1964))).
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constitutional floor and provide additional or a higher level of
procedural protection not mandated by the Constitution.16 Because the
Criminal Rules may overlap with federal constitutional doctrines,
federal courts’ interpretation of them may be informed by an extensive
body of federal constitutional criminal procedure. As noted, this body of
law is mostly concerned with seeking to identify the floor for
constitutional procedural protection available to criminal defendants
generally, not the outer reaches of the procedural protection available to
federal defendants under the Criminal Rules. A logical, but often
overlooked, aspect of federal courts’ interpretation and application of a
given Criminal Rule in this context is whether a federal criminal
defendant’s request for pretrial relief should be governed or limited by
the constitutional floor that applies when a federal court is reviewing a
criminal proceeding post-conviction. As discussed below, this is an
interpretive issue on which federal courts have reached different
conclusions. This article argues that, absent a clear Congressional intent
or a institutional or systemic justification to do otherwise, the pretrial
procedural protection extended to an accused should not be the same as
that afforded to a convicted offender and that federal trial courts should
be required to apply preventative interpretation the Criminal Rules.
II. Conflating Post-Conviction Due Process Review and
Pretrial Relief Standards – Two Examples
A premise of this article is that federal courts have been
inconsistent in analyzing whether federal pretrial procedural
requirements under the Criminal Rules are coextensive with postconviction due process standards. To illustrate this inconsistency, this
article considers two frequently litigated federal pretrial procedures and
their companion due process doctrines. This section examines
contemporary federal courts’ treatment of these two pretrial criminal
procedures vis-a-vis their constitutional counterparts and argues that
federal courts’ application of post-conviction review standards to pretrial
16

See, e.g., Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“The Criminal
Rules . . . implemented the constitutional mandates but introduced a degree of
flexibility of which the accused might optionally avail.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
21(a)-(b) advisory committee’s note (“The rule provides for a change of venue only on
defendant’s motion and does not extend the same right to the prosecution, since the
defendant has a constitutional right to a trial in the district where the offense was
committed. . . . By making a motion for a change of venue, however, the defendant
waives this constitutional right.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 3; id. amend.
VI)).
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motions may unjustifiably and unjustly constrain the procedural relief
available to federal defendants under the Criminal Rules.
In federal cases, pretrial discovery is governed by Criminal Rule
16(a) and Fifth Amendment due process guarantees. Both Criminal Rule
16(a) and Fifth Amendment due process require defendants to make a
threshold showing of “materiality” to compel disclosure of the bulk of
discoverable material in a criminal prosecution. That is, for most
categories of discovery in a federal criminal case, the defendant must
show that the items requested are “material” to the defense. Although
the term used for the showing required for both – “material” – is the
same, federal courts may interpret the term differently depending on
whether a defendant’s discovery request is made under Criminal Rule
16(a), on one hand, or under the Fifth Amendment due process clause,
on the other. Specifically, where a federal defendant relies on the Fifth
Amendment to compel discovery, most federal courts, relying on a body
of jurisprudence developed in the context of post-conviction review,
interpret the term “materiality” to require a higher showing than a
motion brought under Criminal Rule 16(a). And federal courts have
uniformly concluded that the materiality showing required under
Criminal Rule 16(a) is not particularly demanding. Thus, under federal
criminal pretrial procedure, what is “material” for purposes of Criminal
Rule 16(a) may not be “material” for purposes of constitutional due
process, leading to a more constrained interpretation of what pretrial
discovery the prosecution is required to produce under a due process
standard as opposed to a request under Criminal Rule 16(a). At the same
time, unlike many state criminal procedural codes that require “lay
down” discovery, a federal prosecutor’s discovery obligations under
Criminal Rule 16(a) are limited to specific categories of evidence, which
are comparatively limited in scope. The result is that to establish a due
process claim to production of items that fall outside the specific
categories of evidence identified in Criminal Rule 16(a), a federal
defendant must make a higher pretrial showing of materiality than he or
she is required to make to obtain discovery under Criminal Rule 16(a).
The second example is pretrial change of venue motions,
specifically, change of venue motions that rely on prejudice in the trial
district as a basis for transferring a proceeding to another venue. In
federal cases, this pretrial procedure is governed by Criminal Rule 21(a),
Fifth Amendment due process guarantees, and the Sixth Amendment
impartial jury right. In the post-conviction context, the Supreme Court
has recognized that a change of venue may be constitutionally required
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in some cases of local prejudice,17 and it has set a high bar for making
this showing.18 However, the question of whether a federal defendant’s
motion for pretrial relief under Criminal Rule 21(a) is governed by the
constitutional standard developed in the post-conviction review context
remains contested.
A. Materiality and Pretrial Discovery
The state and federal criminal justice systems have embraced
very different philosophies and approaches to criminal discovery.
Compared with liberal criminal discovery adopted by some states,
federal criminal discovery is quite limited.19 Federal defendants have
three bases for requesting pretrial discovery: (1) Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(a), (2) the Jencks Act, and (3) the Fifth
Amendment due process clause.20
As discussed below, to obtain some categories of discovery
under Criminal Rule 16(a) a federal defendant must make a showing of
“materiality.” To forward a Brady claim, defendants must also make a
“materiality” showing. Thus, the term “materiality” is used in both
contexts. Although the same term is used in both contexts, a three way
split of authority exists regarding how to apply the Brady constitutional
materiality requirement pretrial. This section sets out and discusses the
three views taken by federal courts that have considered this issue: (1)
the definition of materiality for Criminal Rule 16(a) is different from the
17

See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1971) (holding that in some cases,
a change of venue may be the only constitutionally adequate remedy for prejudicial
pretrial publicity).
18
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
19
John D. Cline, It Is Time to Fix the Federal Criminal System, CHAMPION, Sept.
2011, at 34, 35 (“In some states, liberal discovery rules offset the prosecutor’s
overwhelming pre-indictment information-gathering advantage. In the federal system,
however, discovery is limited.”); H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed
Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption,
43 Rutgers L. Rev. 1089, 1089 (1991) (“It is an astonishing anomaly that in federal
courts virtually unrestricted discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is
severely limited in criminal matters.”).
20
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (requiring disclosure of defendant’s oral or recorded
statements and prior criminal record, certain documents and tangible objects, reports of
medical examinations and scientific tests, and a summary of expert testimony); Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012) (requiring disclosure of certain pretrial statements of
government witnesses after the witness testifies on direct examination); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”).
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Brady post-conviction materiality standard, (2) the Brady materiality
standard in the pretrial context is co-extensive with the materiality
definition applied to Criminal Rule 16(a), and (3) the Brady materiality
standard entirely forecloses any constitutional grounds for requesting or
ordering pretrial discovery.
Criminal Rule 16 sets out two categories of discovery federal
defendants are entitled to that are governed by two different standards.
The first category consists of discovery a defendant is entitled to upon
request, with no additional showing needed to trigger the government’s
production obligation. This category includes the defendant’s oral,
written, or recorded statements,21 the defendant’s prior criminal record22,
and a written summary of expert witness testimony the government
intends to use in its case-in-chief.23 The second category consists of
discovery a defendant is entitled to only upon request and a showing of
materiality. This category consists of documents and objects, and reports
of examinations and tests within the government’s possession, custody,
or control that are “material” to the defense:
(E) Documents and Objects. Upon a defendant’s request, the
government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or
photograph [documents and objects] . . . if the item is within the
government’s possession, custody, or control and . . . the item is
material to preparing the defense[.24]
(F) Reports of Examinations and Tests. Upon a defendant’s
request, the government must permit a defendant to inspect and
to copy or photograph the results or reports of any physical or
21

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(C).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
23
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G).
24
Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(ii) and (iii) further provide that the government must, upon a
defendant’s request, provide “documents and objects” it intends to use in its case-inchief at trial, or items obtained from or belonging to the defendant without requiring a
showing of materiality showing. With respect to items falling under these two latter
categories, the materiality of items is presumed without requiring an independent
showing by the defendant. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1974
amendment) (“[S]ubdivision (a)(1)(C) also contains language to compel disclosure if
the government intends to use the property as evidence at the trial or if the property was
obtained from or belongs to the defendant . . . [t]his is probably the result under old rule
16 since the fact that the government intends to use the physical evidence at the trial is
probably sufficient proof of ‘materiality.’ . . . Requiring disclosure of documents and
tangible objects which ‘were obtained from or belong to the defendant’ probably is also
making explicit in the rule what would otherwise be the interpretation of ‘materiality.’”
(citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 254 (1st
ed. 1969 & Supp. 1971))).
22
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mental examination and of any scientific test or experiment
if . . . the item is within the government’s possession, custody, or
control; . . . the attorney for the government knows – or through
reasonable diligence could know – that the item exists; and . . .
the item is material to preparing the defense or the government
intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial.
The definition of “document and objects” under Criminal Rule
16(a) is extensive. 25 And it will usually encompass the largest category
of discoverable items in a federal criminal matter. As a result, a federal
defendant will ordinarily need to make a pretrial showing of materiality
under Criminal Rule 16 to obtain the bulk of discoverable items in the
government’s possession or control.
Criminal Rule 16 is not the only grounds for obtaining pretrial
discovery in a federal case – whether a criminal defendant is entitled to
compel the government to produce evidence pretrial is an issue with
constitutional dimensions as well. A defendant has no general federal
constitutional right to discover any of the prosecution’s evidence.26
However, under the Constitution, it is a violation of due process for the
prosecutor to withhold exculpatory information that is “material” to the
defense under a constitutional doctrine referred to as the “Brady Rule.”27
In Brady, the Supreme Court established that the suppression of
evidence requested by an accused pretrial that might reasonably be
considered favorable to the defense violates federal due process if the
evidence is material to the guilt or punishment of the accused.28
Thus, the Brady Rule stands for the proposition that a defendant
has a constitutionally cognizable claim if the prosecution fails to
produce evidence pretrial that: (1) relates to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant29 and (2) is “material.”30 Although Brady established a
25

The definition of “documents and objects” encompasses “books, papers, document,
data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any of
these items.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E).
26
See United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1421 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme
Court has made it clear . . . that there is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case.”).
27
The rule’s name refers to Brady v. Maryland, a post-conviction challenge to a state
court conviction in which the Court held that due process requires the prosecution to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused. 373 U.S. 83, 85, 87 (1963).
28
Id. at 87 (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.”).
29
See Christopher Deal, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to
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materiality requirement, it did not define the term “material.”31 Instead,
it left the issue to be resolved in future cases. Post-Brady, in United
States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court established that evidence is only
material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”32 A “reasonable probability”, the Supreme Court explained,
“is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”33
In Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court subsequently reiterated
that constitutional error in the context of undisclosed evidence arises
only if the evidence was material.34 In Kyles, the Court also provided a
comprehensive explanation of the four aspects of materiality pertinent to
the constitutional inquiry. First, a reasonable probability of a different
result is shown where suppression of evidence undermines confidence in
the outcome of the trial.35 Second, a Brady violation is established if
“favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”36 Third,
once a reviewing court has found constitutional error, there is no need
for further harmless error review. And, fourth, whether suppressed
evidence is “material” is “considered collectively, not item by item.”37
In other words, a federal court will find no Brady violation absent a
showing of a reasonable probability of a different (i.e. more favorable)
outcome in the proceeding had the government timely disclosed the
evidence in question in light of all the other evidence admitted at trial.
The due process materiality definition has been articulated as a
purely post-conviction standard – under it, a defendant is only entitled to
Disclose and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1811-12 (2007)
(“[I]nculpatory evidence . . . tends to prove the defendant’s guilt, and favorable
evidence . . . tends to negate guilt or render inculpatory evidence less credible.”).
30
See 2 WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 2, at § 256 (“Even if evidence is exculpatory and
not disclosed by the prosecutor, a Brady violation occurs only if the information was
“material.”).
31
See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2001) (opining that Brady
likely used “material” in its evidentiary sense to include all “evidence that has some
probative tendency to preclude a finding of guilt or lessen punishment”).
32
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
33
Id.
34
514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (stating that the materiality standard examines whether, in
the absence of the suppressed evidence, the defendant “received a fair trial,” meaning a
trial “resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence”).
35
Id. at 435.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 436.
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relief if the defendant can show that the withheld evidence would have
made a difference in the outcome of the defendant’s trial. To make that
evaluation, a trial court must necessarily know the outcome of the
defendant’s trial, which, obviously, can only be known post trial. A
review standard that looks at the impact of withheld evidence on a trial
makes sense in the appellate context. However, an obvious dissonance
presents itself when the Brady standard is applied in a pretrial context
since a trial a court logically cannot evaluate whether evidence withheld
by the prosecution would have changed the outcome of a proceeding
until a conviction has been obtained. Thus, like the appellate harmless
error standard,38 the Brady “reasonable probability” materiality standard
is applied from a retrospective, post-conviction vantage point. In the
pretrial context, its application is nonsensical, if not impossible.39
Indeed, this is something the Advisory Committee noted when it
amended Criminal Rule 16 in 1974, roughly a decade after Brady, by
acknowledging that a pretrial materiality requirement may be difficult
for a defendant to meet “if he does not know what the evidence is.”40
Federal courts have acknowledged (and federal defendants have
litigated) the anomaly of applying a post-conviction reasonable
probability materiality standard to pretrial Brady requests. Even though
the reasonable probability materiality standard requires a trial court to
assume a hindsight perspective that it cannot possess pretrial, most
federal trial courts require defendants to meet the post-conviction
materiality standard to establish a constitutional pretrial claim to
discovery.41 Some federal trial courts have gone further, concluding that
38

See Deal, supra note 29, at1783-84 (citations and footnotes omitted) (“Brady
materiality is, in some ways, analogous to harmless-error review. . . . The idea behind
harmless error is simple: Courts will not reverse a defendant’s conviction unless the
error might have mattered. Depending on the type of error, courts require differing
levels of certitude that the error did not make a difference. With Brady materiality, the
suppression of favorable evidence does not entitle a defendant to a new trial unless its
disclosure portends a reasonable probability of a different result. . . . On this account,
the government’s pretrial nondisclosure violates Brady only if it would merit reversal
on appeal.”).
39
See Kyles, 473 U.S. 667, 700 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that pretrial
materiality is a standard that “virtually defies definition”); see also Cline, supra note 19,
at 35 (describing the Brady rule as “largely toothless” because of the materiality
requirement).
40
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1974 amendment) (citing
STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §2.1(a)(v) and
commentary at 68–69 (Approved Draft 1970)).
41
See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, No. CR 09-3598 JB, 2010 WL 4337819 (D.N.M.
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the Brady materiality standard entirely forecloses any basis for ordering
pretrial discovery on constitutional grounds, leaving Criminal Rule 16(a)
as federal defendants’ sole ground for obtaining pretrial discovery.42
Because the scope of material deemed “Brady” material may be broader
than the categories of discovery covered by Criminal Rule 16(a), the
result under this approach is to leave federal defendants no pretrial
procedural basis for obtaining discovery that may be material to the
defense, but that falls outside Criminal Rule 16(a). Under this approach,
a federal defendant’s cannot obtain discovery pretrial based on a due
process claim, only challenge the suppression of evidence through a
post-conviction challenge. Further, the federal courts that apply the
Brady post-conviction materiality standard to pretrial discovery requests
do so not because they consider the approach analytically sound. Rather,
they do so because they have concluded they are constrained by
Supreme Court precedent to apply the constitutional hindsight standard
to pretrial discovery requests.43 Supreme Court precedent
Sept. 3, 2010) (“In light of the Tenth Circuit’s [precedent] . . . the Supreme Court’s
unambiguous holding that no constitutional violation occurs unless the United States
withholds evidence material to guilt or punishment, and that materiality means evidence
for which there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, a different verdict
would have resulted, the Court is not inclined to adopt [a] broad pretrial disclosure
standard. . . . [T]he Court believes that such an approach gets close to civil discovery
rather than the standard the American courts have employed since Brady v. Maryland.”
(citing United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 1988); Cone v. Bell,
556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985))); see
also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing trial court
order requiring immediate pretrial disclosure of all favorable evidence in the
government’s possession and rejecting a different pretrial Brady standard despite the
difficulties inherent in determining materiality at that juncture); United States v. Acosta,
357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1243 (D. Nev. 2005) (materiality standard governs Brady pretrial
requests).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Causey, 356 F. Supp. 2d 681, 688, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (denying motion to compel production
of Brady evidence before trial and citing Fifth Circuit precedents holding that “Brady is
not a pretrial remedy”); see also United States v. Washington, 669 F. Supp. 1447, 1451
(N.D. Ind. 1987) (“An order to produce Brady materials makes as little sense as an
order to preserve the accused’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . [f]rom a court’s perspective, Brady is remedial in nature.”).
43
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976) (“Logically the same
standard [for materiality] must apply [before and after trial]. For unless the omission
deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no constitutional violation requiring that
the verdict be set aside; and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the
prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose. . . . [but materiality determinations would
be] inevitably imprecise . . . because the significance of an item of evidence can seldom
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notwithstanding, a handful of federal courts have rejected the application
of a post-conviction materiality definition to pretrial Brady requests,
holding that the prosecution must disclose all evidence favorable to the
defense pretrial, regardless of whether it is likely to affect the outcome
of the proceeding.44
Like Brady, Criminal Rule 16(a) also limits the government’s
pretrial discovery obligation to certain items that are “material.”
Although federal courts have been inconsistent in the application of the
Brady materiality standard pretrial, they uniformly recognize a more
liberal materiality requirement applies to pretrial discovery requests
under Criminal Rule 16(a).45 Brady, as discussed, is limited to evidence
that is favorable or helpful to the defense if there is a reasonable
probability pretrial disclosure of the withheld discovery would have

be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete.”); see also Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“[Brady] requires less of the prosecution than the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any
evidence tending to exculpate or mitigate.”); Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (“Kyles’
articulation of the four prong test for determining materiality persuades the court that
the Supreme Court would reject the position . . . that all exculpatory evidence and
information that might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is subject to
mandatory pretrial disclosure under Brady and Giglio.”).
44
See United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that
pretrial judgments on materiality are “speculative” and dependent on questions that are
“unknown or unknowable,” and that the government’s effort to evaluate its disclosure
obligations in light of post-conviction materiality standards is an attempt to “look at the
case pretrial through the end of the telescope an appellate court would use post-trial”);
United States v. Carter, 313 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (“[Because a court]
cannot know what possible effect certain evidence will have on a trial not yet held. . . .
[courts] should ordinarily require the pre-trial disclosure of all exculpatory or
impeachment evidence [without regard to materiality].”); United States v. Sudikoff, 36
F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“[Materiality] standard is only appropriate,
and thus applicable, in the context of appellate review.”); see also United States v. Jack,
257 F.R.D. 221, 229 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“It has been suggested that where there is a
pretrial motion seeking Brady material, the question is strictly whether the evidence
sought is favorable to the defense and that the concept of materiality is irrelevant.”
(citing Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1243; Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1199)).
45
See Safavian, 233 F.R.D. at 15-16; United States v. Marshall, 132 F.3d 63, 69 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United
States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 11, 13 (D.D.C. 1991) (Rule 16(a) materiality hurdle “is
not a high one”); United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (D.D.C. 1989)
(“[Rule 16 is] designed to provide to a criminal defendant . . . the widest possible
opportunity to inspect and receive such materials in the possession of the Government
as may aid him in presenting his side of the case.”).
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changed the outcome of the trial.46 In contrast, federal courts interpret
Criminal Rule 16(a)’s materiality standard as setting a much lower bar
for establishing materiality. Under the standard courts apply to Criminal
Rule 16(a), evidence is considered material “if there is a strong
indication that it may play an important role in uncovering admissible
evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or
assisting impeachment or rebuttal.”47 Similarly, federal courts interpret
the government’s Criminal Rule 16(a) discovery obligation to require
production of inculpatory, as well as exculpatory evidence (i.e. favorable
or helpful to the defense).48 Federal courts have further held that the
government cannot limit its Criminal Rule 16(a) pretrial discovery
obligations by reading the term “material” narrowly or “put itself in the
shoes of defense counsel in attempting to predict the nature of what the
defense may be or what may be material to its preparation.”49
Thus, there is consensus among federal courts that the
materiality requirement under Criminal Rule 16(a) is to be read liberally.
But a three-way split of authority exists regarding how to apply the
Brady constitutional materiality requirement pretrial. The three views
taken by federal courts that have considered this issue are: (1) the
definition of materiality for Criminal Rule 16(a) is different from the
Brady post-conviction materiality standard, with pretrial Brady requests
subject to a higher showing of materiality than Rule-based requests, (2)
the Brady materiality standard in the pretrial context is co-extensive with
the materiality definition applied to Criminal Rule 16(a), and (3) the
Brady materiality standard entirely forecloses any constitutional grounds
for requesting or ordering pretrial discovery, leaving Criminal Rule
16(a), as federal defendants’ sole basis for requesting discovery pretrial
in federal proceedings.
B. Fair, Impartial Trial and Change of Venue
Before Congress adopted the Criminal Rules, there was no
provision in federal law allowing defendants to seek a change of venue
on the basis of local prejudice in the venue where the trial was set.50 For
46

See supra text accompanying note 27.
Lloyd, 992 F.2d at 351 (citing George, 786 F. Supp. at 56, 58).
48
Marshall, 132 F.3d at 69.
49
Safavian, 233 F.R.D. at 15-16.
50
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 (Preliminary Draft No. 2 1944) advisory committee’s note,
reprinted in 4 Drafting History of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 107
(Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFTING HISTORY]
47
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the first time under federal law, the 1944 Criminal Rules included a
change of venue provision.51 The provision requires federal courts to
transfer a criminal proceeding upon a defendant’s motion if the court is
“satisfied” that there exists “so great a prejudice” in the venue where the
proceeding is pending that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial there.52
The current version of Rule 21(a)53 is virtually identical to the
original version of the rule. Since its enactment, the Rule has been
amended only to remove the reference to “division” in the original
version to reflect the elimination of Division venue within the Federal
District Courts, and to replace the word “shall” with the word “must” to
incorporate global stylistic changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.54 The current version of Rule 21(a) reads as follows:

(citations to state codes omitted) (“The rule introduces into the federal criminal
procedure a method of transferring cases from one federal district to another in two
situations. The first (Subdivision (a)) is that frequently covered in state codes, i.e.,
where a fair trial cannot be had in the place where the prosecution is instituted. There is
no provision similar to these state statutes in the statutes regulating federal criminal
procedure.”).
51
See Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (internal citations and
footnotes omitted) (“The Constitution ordains the trial of offenses against the United
States in the state and district of alleged commission. . . . Although the Fifth
Amendment secures the right to a fair trial, and the Sixth the right to an impartial jury,
no method of removing the case was then available, even where prejudice in the locality
of the crime made an unbiased verdict quite impossible . . . . Among the innovations [of
the Criminal Rules] were provisions for . . . a change of venue when community
prejudice forestalled a fair trial locally.”).
52
See supra note 50.
53
The change of venue rule was originally contained in proposed Rule 40(c)(2). It
subsequently appeared in Rule 23 in the Preliminary Drafts and Final Report, and in
Rule 21 in the final version of the Rules. See 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 50, at
127 tbl.B. Although Rule 21 has been amended on several occasions (Rule 21 was
amended in 1966, 1987, 2002, and 2010), the change of venue provision has remained
substantively unchanged. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21 advisory committee’s note.
54
The 1966 version of Criminal Rule 21 eliminated the reference to transferring to
another Division within a District. This change reflects the elimination of Division
venue in 1966. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21 advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment). The
current version of Rule 21 uses the term “must” rather than “shall” to describe the
court’s obligation to grant a venue change. The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that
these terminology changes are stylistic and technical. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21 and advisory
committee’s note (2002 amendment); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 and advisory
committee’s note (2002 amendment).
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Rule 21. Transfer for Trial
(a) For Prejudice. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court must
transfer the proceeding against that defendant to another district
if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the
defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant
cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there.
As with Criminal Rule 16(a), Rule 21(a) was enacted and
amended against a backdrop of pre-existing constitutional jurisprudence
that overlaps with the substance of the rule. In the case of Criminal Rule
21(a), the overlapping constitutional doctrines arise under the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to a trial before an impartial jury and the Fifth
Amendment due process fair trial guarantee.55 When Criminal Rule
21(a) was adopted in 1944, federal courts had already identified local
prejudice in the district where a defendant was to stand trial as an issue
with constitutional dimensions. For example, as early as 1807 in the trial
of Aaron Burr for treason and related crimes, Chief Justice John
Marshall, sitting as a circuit judge, interpreted the constitutional
impartial jury guarantee to require disqualification of jurors in the
charging venue who had expressed any opinion on “any fact conductive
to the final decision of the case.”56 Later federal court opinions
considered and refined the Sixth Amendment constitutional
jurisprudence, defining the meaning of an “impartial” juror and
identifying the contours of the due process fair trial guarantee in the face
of local prejudice in the charging venue.57
When Criminal Rule 21(a) was adopted, a body of constitutional
law existed addressing the underlying substance of that procedural rule –
55

The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to trial by an
impartial jury “in the State where the . . . Crimes . . . have been committed.” U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. amend. VI (conferring the right to trial by “jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). The Supreme
Court extended Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantees to state court proceedings in its
1968 decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Prior to that, cases
considering juror bias in the charging venue were analyzed as a Fourteenth Amendment
due process proposition, not as a Sixth Amendment question. See Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961).
56
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
57
See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“The theory of our system is
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and
argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or
public print.”).
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protecting a defendant’s impartial jury and fair trial rights in a
proceeding set in a venue where those rights may be compromised by
local prejudice. Some federal courts concluded they had inherent
authority and discretion to order a change of venue before Criminal Rule
21(a) was adopted.58 However, with no change of venue provision in
existence under federal law prior to the adoption of Criminal Rule 21(a),
federal courts did not have a clear source of authority to order a change
of venue. The innovation of Criminal Rule 21(a) was to establish a
preventative pretrial procedure requiring trial courts to move federal
criminal proceedings when a defendant establishes, to the satisfaction of
the trial court, that local prejudice threatens the defendant’s ability to
obtain a fair and impartial trial in the venue where trial is set.59
Criminal Rule 21(a), of course, did not create a new procedural
right to a fair and impartial jury in the trial venue; that right already
existed under the federal constitution.60 What Criminal Rule 21(a) did
was establish a change of venue as a procedural remedy available to
defendants able to show that they could not secure an impartial jury in
the trial venue due to local prejudice. In contrast, there was no
corresponding federal law addressing the issue of remedying local
prejudice in state court proceedings as a matter of federal constitutional
law until the 1960s. Thus, federal defendants were afforded a procedural
right to a change of venue when Criminal Rule 21(a) was adopted in
1944. But the Court did not recognize a federal constitutional claim to a
change of venue based on local prejudice until almost two decades later
after federal habeas became established as a forum for litigating federal
constitutional claims and produced a well-developed body of federal
constitutional criminal procedural law in the context of challenges to

58

See, e.g., United States v. Reece, 280 F. 913 (D. Idaho 1922).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a) provides that a federal trial court “must”
change venue “if [it] is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in
the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there.”
FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a).
60
See Skilling v. United States (Skilling II), 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2913 (2010) (“The
Constitution’s place-of-trial prescriptions . . . do not impede transfer of [a] proceeding
to a different [venue] district at the defendant’s request if extraordinary local prejudice
will prevent a fair trial—a ‘basic requirement of due process.’” (citing In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))); Krogmann v. United States, 225 F.2d 220, 228 (6th Cir.
1955) (recognizing that newspaper articles actually read by jurors that convey highly
prejudicial information not admissible or admitted at trial constitutes such essential
unfairness as to justify the setting aside of the verdict and the granting of a new trial).
59
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state court conviction on federal constitutional grounds.61
In the early to mid-sixties, the Supreme Court decided a series of
cases involving post-conviction challenges to state court proceedings
contending that local prejudice, trial court procedures, and/or media
coverage in the charging venue had deprived petitioners of their federal
constitutional right to due process.62 When these cases arose, the
Supreme Court had not yet held that Sixth Amendment jury trial
guarantees extended to state court proceedings.63 Thus, the state court
petitioners in these early cases sought relief on Fourteenth Amendment
due process grounds, not under the Sixth Amendment impartial jury
right. In these cases, the Supreme Court reversed the state court
convictions at issue, holding for the first time that local prejudice and
the conditions under which a trial takes place may deprive a defendant
of the federal constitutional right to due process.
This early case law concerning the fair trial rights of state court
defendants on post-conviction review formed the foundation for the
constitutional change of venue standard that would come to be applied
in federal cases as well. Because these cases involved state court
proceedings and Sixth Amendment protections had not yet been
extended to state court proceedings, the Court originally articulated the
standard as a due process, not a Sixth Amendment proposition.64 Under
one early formulation of the due process standard, in Sheppard v.
Maxwell, the Supreme Court held that a defendant was constitutionally
entitled to a remedy if the defendant could show a “reasonable
likelihood” that prejudice in the charging venue “will prevent a fair
trial.”65 Debate exists as to whether the “reasonable likelihood” standard
61

See Steiker, supra note 9, at 319 (“It was not until the 1950s and early 1960s that
the modern role of federal habeas as a forum for relitigating virtually all federal
constitutional claims was firmly established, with defendants litigating federal habeas
applications in a manner similar to other federal civil suits.”).
62
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538
(1965); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (“The requirement that a
jury’s verdict ‘must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial’ goes to the
fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by
jury. . . . [and the Constitution requires] at the very least that the ‘evidence developed’
against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where
there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of crossexamination, and of counsel.”).
63
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
64
See id.
65
384 U.S. at 363; see also United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 1982)
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remains viable. Some state and federal courts continue to apply this
standard.66 However, the Supreme Court has not relied on the Sheppard
“reasonable likelihood” language to resolve an impartial/fair trial right
issue since it decided that case in 1966.67 And it appears that the
Supreme Court has silently disavowed the “reasonable likelihood” test
and replaced it with a more exacting local prejudice standard.68
The local prejudice standard later incorporated the Sixth
Amendment impartial jury right, and it has undergone several
transformations since its inception. Under the current postconviction
constitutional change of venue standard, a defendant must establish
either presumed or actual prejudice in the potential jury pool in the
charging venue.69 The presumed prejudice standard has evolved into a
(“[The standard asks whether] prejudicial, inflammatory publicity about [the] case so
saturated the community from which his jury was drawn as to render it virtually
impossible to obtain an impartial jury.”).
66
The following illustrative federal cases recite the change of venue standard to
require a showing that the defendant’s prospects of not receiving a fair and impartial
trial in the charging venue are “reasonably certain,” or “likely,” or other similar terms.
United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d
1270 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Kouri-Perez, 985 F. Supp. 25 (D.P.R. 1997); Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F.
Supp. 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (D. Wis. 1974);
see also United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (citing Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)) (identifying the contemporary federal practice as
consistent with the due process “reasonable likelihood” standard).
67
See State v. Bradley, 461 N.W. 2d 524, 536 (Neb. 1990) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme
Court did not apply Sheppard’s “reasonable likelihood” test [in subsequent cases to
resolve pretrial publicity issues] . . . . [O]urs represents the better reasoned view is
further supported by the like application the federal courts make of Fed. R. Crim. P.
21(a), which provides that a change of venue may be had ‘if the court is satisfied that
there exists . . . so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot
obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place fixed by law for holding court in that
district.’ . . . It is also significant that the ‘cannot’ language present in the rule at the
time Sheppard was decided has not been changed.” (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794 (1975); Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221 (Alaska 1979); People v. McCrary, 549 P.2d
1320 (Colo. 1976))); see also Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619; United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d
364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974). But see
Marcello, 280 F. Supp. at 513-14.
68
Constance M. Jones, Comment, Appellate Review of Criminal Change of Venue
Rulings: The Demise of California’s Reasonable Likelihood Standard, 71 Calif. L. Rev.
703, 704 (1983) (asserting that Murphy clarifies that the Sheppard language is not
constitutionally required and that there are only two alternative federal tests—actual
prejudice and inherent prejudice).
69
See United States v. Skilling (Skilling I), 554 F.3d 529, 559 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, and remanded by 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (explaining the
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multi-factor test that requires a defendant to show “that prejudicial,
inflammatory publicity about [the defendant’s] case so saturated the
community from which his jury was drawn as to render it virtually
impossible to obtain an impartial jury” in order to obtain a change of
venue.70 Under that test, which is highly deferential to trial court
evaluations of local prejudice, the reviewing court is required to look at
the voir dire record, the atmosphere of the community at the time of the
trial, and the length to which the trial court had to go to select impartial
jurors.71 Most recently, in reviewing a challenge to a federal conviction,
the Supreme Court suggested that the jury’s ultimate verdict is an
additional factor a reviewing court should consider in evaluating
whether a trial court erred in denying a defendant’s pretrial motion to
change venue on the ground of local prejudice.72 This new consideration
– the jury’s verdict – is obviously one that is unknowable until after trial.
Where a defendant makes a showing of presumed prejudice, the
defendant does not need to show that any juror was actually biased
against him or her.73 Although Supreme Court precedent provides that
difference between presumed and actual prejudice).
70
Skilling I, 554 F.3d at 558 (quoting United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 250 (5th
Cir. 1982)); see also Skilling II, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2915-17 (2010) (finding that factors
relevant to evaluating presumed prejudice include: (1) “media interference with
courtroom proceedings”; (2) “the size and characteristics of the community in which the
crime occurred”; (3) the nature and tone of the media publicity; (4) the amount of time
that had elapsed between the crime and the trial; (5) the impact of the crime on the
community; and (6) the effect of a co-defendant’s “well publicized decision to plead
guilty”); Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799-803.
71
After Murphy, in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984), the Supreme Court
held that it would apply a presumption of correctness to a trial court’s assessment of
prejudicial pretrial publicity, under the “totality of the circumstances” standard, and that
it would only reverse a conviction upon a showing of “manifest error,” thus raising the
standard for post-conviction relief based on local prejudice even higher. Irvin, one of
the Court’s foundational change of venue cases, was decided five years before Congress
added to the habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state-court
factual findings, see Act of Nov. 11, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1105–
1106, and two years before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963), provided the guidelines that were later codified.
72
In Skilling, the Supreme Court considered it “of prime significance” that Skilling’s
jury acquitted him of some of the numerous counts the government brought against
him. See Skilling II, 130 S. Ct. at 2916.
73
Skilling I, 554 F.3d at 558 (“[P]roof of such poisonous publicity raises a
presumption that appellant’s jury was prejudiced, relieving him of the obligation to
establish actual prejudice by a juror in his case.”); see also United States v. Williams,
523 F.2d 1203, 1208 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that evidence of pervasive community
prejudice against the accused dispenses with the requirement that actual jury prejudice
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both presumed and actual prejudice may be grounds for a change of
venue or post-conviction relief, as a practical matter, very few change of
venue motions have ever been granted (or convictions reversed) on
presumed prejudice grounds alone.74 Further, according to some, but not
all, federal circuit courts75, the presumed prejudice showing comes with
an important qualifier – the government is permitted to rebut a
presumption of presumed prejudice if it can show, notwithstanding the
defendant’s showing of presumed prejudice that, based on the voir dire
record, there was no actual bias and that the trial court, therefore,
actually impaneled an impartial jury in the defendant’s case.76 Where the
government rebuts a showing of presumed prejudice, “the conviction
will stand despite appellant’s showing of adverse pretrial publicity.”77
Thus, in practice, a defendant cannot obtain a change of venue pretrial
(or reversal of a conviction post-trial for failure to grant a change of
venue) on constitutional grounds unless the defendant can show, based
on the trial court record, that the trial court actually seated a juror who
was biased against the defendant.
The adoption of Criminal Rule 21(a) predated the development
of the Supreme Court’s local prejudice/impartial jury right jurisprudence
be shown).
74
Although the Supreme Court continues to recognize the possibility of presumed
prejudice as a basis for a change of venue, it has not overturned a single conviction on
presumed prejudice grounds since Rideau. Similarly, only a handful of federal pretrial
change of venue motions have been granted on presumed prejudice grounds. See, e.g.,
United States v. McVeigh (McVeigh I), 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (W.D. Okla. 1996)
(finding presumed local prejudice case arising out of bombing of Federal Office
Building in Oklahoma City warranted change of venue without necessity of engaging in
voir dire); see also Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (“[T]he Rideau principle of [presumed] prejudice
is only rarely applicable . . . and is confined to those instances where the petitioner can
demonstrate an extreme situation of inflammatory pretrial publicity that literally
saturated the community in which his trial was held.”).
75
See Christina Collins, Comment, Stuck in the 1960s: Supreme Court Misses an
Opportunity in Skilling v. United States to Bring Venue Jurisprudence into the TwentyFirst Century, 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 391 (2012) (noting that some federal circuits have
concluded that an actual prejudice showing is rebuttable by the government, an issue
the Supreme Court declined to resolve in Skilling).
76
United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (explaining that even if a defendant cannot meet the higher burden for
finding presumed prejudice, it is possible for the defendant to “raise[] a significant
possibility of prejudice” such that the district court’s voir dire is subject to additional
scrutiny).
77
Id.
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by over fifteen years. As noted, this body of law arose in the context of
federal review of state court convictions to ensure compliance with
minimum federal due process standards as articulated by the Supreme
Court. When the Supreme Court took up these state court challenges,
relatively few cases interpreting Criminal Rule 21(a) had been decided
by federal courts.78 As a result, there was no early delineation between
these two separate bases for requiring a change of venue in federal
cases, just a developing body of law involving state court proceedings in
which the Supreme Court had recognized a federal due process right to
procedural relief to counteract local prejudice in a charging district.
Possibly due to the lack of a free-standing body of case law
under Criminal Rule 21(a), early on, many federal courts simply
incorporated the Supreme Court’s due process post-conviction
constitutional analysis into their resolution of federal defendants’ rulebased motions to change venue.79 The effect of lower federal courts’
reliance on the Supreme Court’s early change of venue decisions
involving state proceedings was to unnecessarily “constitutionalize” the
federal change of venue motion under Rule 21(a) by infusing federal
courts’ interpretation of the federal procedural rule with constitutional
standards developed in the context of post-conviction review. 80 As with
the Brady post-conviction materiality discovery standard, the actual
prejudice prong of the change of venue inquiry is retrospective in that it
is based on a review of the record of voir dire conducted by the trial
court and, post-Skilling, apparently the jury’s verdict as well. And, like
the Brady post-conviction due process standard, the change of venue due
process standard is described by some courts as imposing a “substantial
burden” on a defendant to satisfy a court that so great a prejudice exists
in the trial venue that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial there.81
78

See, e.g., Juelich v. United States, 214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512 (S.D. Tex. 1955); United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
79
See, e.g., United States v. Holder, 399 F. Supp. 220, 225-26 (D.S.D. 1975) (“[Rule
21(a)] provides a procedural device for the defendant to waive his right to a trial in the
place where the crime was committed in order to maximally protect his [constitutional]
right to a fair and impartial hearing.”).
80
See, e.g., United States v. Partin, 320 F. Supp. 275, 279 (E.D. La. 1970) (citing the
constitutional due process standard as the test for a pretrial change of venue under
Criminal Rule 21(a) and describing the defendant’s burden under the Rule as
“substantial”).
81
Id.
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A few federal courts have paused to consider whether Criminal
Rule 21(a) should be interpreted co-extensively with the constitutional
standard developed in the post-conviction change of venue context, or
whether it should be interpreted more liberally in the federal pretrial
context.82 In United States v. Marcello, for example, a case decided not
long after the Supreme Court established the constitutional change of
venue standard, the federal district court noted in dicta that Criminal
Rule 21(a) adopted “the exact phraseology (‘fair and impartial trial’)
which has evolved as the constitutional guarantee provided by the due
process clause and by the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial
jury.”83 Notwithstanding the overlap between the language in Criminal
Rule 21(a) and the Supreme Court’s articulation of the change of venue
due process standard, the Marcello court rejected the notion that pretrial
relief under Criminal Rule 21(a) should “be measured by the same
82

United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. La. 1968); see also United States
v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1209 n.11 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[W]e decline consideration of
two threshold problems that would inhere in an examination of the trial court’s exercise
of discretion in denying appellant’s Rule 21 motion. First, the relationship between the
discretion that a trial judge can exercise in denying a Rule 21 motion and the applicable
due process standards is not altogether clear. Certainly, due process standards place a
bottomline on the discretion exercisable by the district court, but the real question is the
degree by which the district court’s discretion operates within boundaries somewhat
narrower than those set by due process. Second, the extent to which a reviewing court
can look to the actual conduct of the trial in passing on the denial of a Rule 21 motion is
similarly a concern not completely free from difficulty.”); United States v. Mitchell,
752 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219-20 (D. Utah 2010) (“Although Rule 21 adopts the
constitutional guarantees of a fair and impartial trial, courts have recognized that the
rule does not require a defendant to meet the same constitutional standards for a change
of venue that a defendant must show in a post-conviction constitutional attack.” (citing
Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510)).
83
The operative language under both the version of Rule 21(a) considered in Marcello
and the current version is a requirement that the trial court order a change in venue “if
the court is satisfied that there exists in the [venue] so great a prejudice against the
defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial [there].” Marcello, 280 F.
Supp. at 513. The Constitution requires that the government try criminal cases before an
impartial jury “of” the state and district where the crime was committed and that the
defendant be afforded due process of law in criminal cases. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . .”); id. art. III, § 2 (“[Criminal trials] shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed.”); id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). As the Marcello
court noted, the Supreme Court generally refers to this Sixth Amendment/due process
package as the right to a fair and impartial trial. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. at 513.
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standards applicable to the constitutional guarantee; that is, [that] a
change of venue under Rule 21(a) . . . require[s] the same showing
which is necessary to reverse a conviction on the ground that the
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial was violated.”84 Criminal
Rule 21(a), the Marcello court noted, “is preventative. It is anticipatory.
It is not solely curative as is a post-conviction constitutional attack.
Thus, the rule evokes foresight, always a more precious gift than
hindsight, and for this reason the same certainty which warrants the
reversal of a conviction will not always accompany the change of
venue.”85
More recently, in the lower appellate court opinion in Skilling,
the circuit court noted that because the defendant did not distinguish
between the constitutional standard, on one hand, and Criminal Rule
21(a), on the other, in his venue motion it would “review his venue
arguments only against the minimum constitutional baseline, which he
did raise, and not the standard of Rule 21, which would be more
favorable to him.”86 Although the circuit court tacitly recognized that
Criminal Rule 21(a) should present a lighter burden for federal
defendants, it nonetheless concluded that the omission did not matter in
Skilling’s case because it would “come to the same result under either
standard.”87 Unfortunately, because it reached this conclusion, the
84

The Marcello court noted that the language of Criminal Rule 21(a) “may well be the
statutory basis for the well-settled rule that a motion for a change of venue is directed to
the sound discretion of the court” and observed “it could hardly be suggested that the
vital constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial hinges upon the discretion of a trial
judge.” Marcello, 280 F. Supp. at 513 (citing Bearden v. United States, 320 F.2d 99,
101 (5th Cir. 1963); Greenhill v. United States, 298 F.2d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 1962);
Shockley v. United States, 166 F.2d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 1948); Kersten v. United States,
161 F.2d 337, 339 (10th Cir. 1947)).
85
Marcello, 280 F. Supp. at 513 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35
(1965)); see also Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1952) (noting
in case pre-dating Supreme Court change of venue state court due process precedents
that in a federal prosecution, the court was concerned with more than the “rock-bottom
requirements” of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States
v. Tokars, 839 F. Supp. 1578, 1584 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (“Having analyzed the foregoing
factors, the court finds that it is a close question whether a sufficient presumption of
prejudice exists to constitutionally mandate a change of venue . . . . Turning to an
alternative analysis of the motions for change of venue under the principles of the
Marshall [supervisory powers/Rule 21(a)] case, the court similarly finds that a change
of venue should be granted. The decision on this basis is not a close one.”).
86
Skilling I, 554 F.3d 529, 559 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and
remanded by 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
87
Id.
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circuit court in Skilling did not offer any explanation of how the
standards differ.
Skilling eventually made its way to the Supreme Court. To date,
Skilling is the only case in which the Supreme Court has considered a
contemporary venue challenge on direct appeal of a federal conviction –
as discussed, the Court’s previous change of venue case involved postconviction review of state court proceedings and, therefore, only
presented the question of whether a state court proceeding had fallen
below the federal constitutional floor. Like the circuit court in Skilling,
the Supreme Court recognized Criminal Rule 21(a) and the due process
standard as distinct bases for seeking relief in a federal prosecution
without explaining whether or how they differ.88 Thus, in Skilling, the
Supreme Court left unanswered two persistent questions in federal
change of venue jurisprudence implicated in this article. One, is the
pretrial change of venue standard under Federal Rule 21(a) coextensive
with the constitutional standard that has evolved within the context of
post-conviction review? And, two, are change of venue challenges
brought by federal defendants on direct review subject to a less
deferential standard of review than post-conviction challenges to state
court proceedings brought in federal court by state court petitioners?89
Consistent with this doctrinal confusion and lack of guidance
from the Supreme Court, federal courts have reached varying
conclusions on these issues. To add a further level of complexity, in this
context, some federal cases identify a third basis for ordering a pretrial
change of venue, independent of Criminal Rule 21(a) and the
Constitution – a trial court’s inherent, supervisory powers.90 Some
88

Like the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not reach this issue because Skilling
did not properly preserve it. See Skilling II, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2913 n.11 (2010)
(“Skilling does not argue, distinct from his due process challenge, that the District Court
abused its discretion under Rule 21 by declining to move his trial. We therefore review
the District Court’s venue-transfer decision only for compliance with the
Constitution.”); id. at 2953 n.9 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (citations omitted) (“I thus
agree with the Court of Appeals that “[i]t would not have been imprudent for the
[District] [C]ourt to have granted Skilling’s transfer motion. Skilling, however, likely
forfeited any Rule 21 or supervisory powers claim by failing to present it either in his
opening brief before the Fifth Circuit or in his petition for certiorari . . . .”).
89
This are questions that federal courts have recognized for decades and that remains
unresolved. See United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1209 n.11 (5th Cir. 1975)
(noting the existence of an unresolved issue as to whether the trial judge’s discretion on
a Rule 21 motion is more restrictive than that involved in due process review but
finding it unnecessary to address issue).
90
Federal courts have inherent authority to establish more rigorous standards for
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federal courts have concluded that the pretrial change of venue standard
under Criminal Rule 21(a) and/or the supervisory powers doctrine is less
stringent than the federal due process standard.91 Whether relying on
Criminal Rule 21(a) or the supervisory powers doctrine, many federal
courts have observed that the due process standard places a heavier
burden on defendants in seeking a change of venue than the federal
pretrial standard, thus recognizing or assuming there exists a federal
pretrial change of venue standard that is less demanding than the due
process post-conviction standard.92 Still other courts and commentators

federal proceedings than the minimum required of state courts by the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597-98 & nn.9-10 (1976);
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797-798 (1975) (majority opinion); id. at 804
(Burger, C.J., concurring); cf. Williams, 523 F.2d at 1209 n.11. And some federal
courts have explicitly recognized that in the change of venue context, the supervisory
powers doctrine requires a higher level of protection for federal defendants than the due
process standard. See infra note 91.
91
Williams, 523 F.2d at 1209 n.11 (comparing the Rule 21(a) standard to the due
process standards that place a bottom line on a district court’s exercise of discretion);
see, e.g., United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[The reviewing
court has] supervisory power to order a new trial in federal cases for reasons that do not
amount to a due process violation.”); United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir.
1984) (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that federal supervisory standards should apply to
the issue of pretrial publicity, not the due process standard); United States v. Wright,
No. 4:01-CR-03040, 2002 WL 842208 at *10 (D. Neb. May 3, 2002) (finding that it is
“clear error” to evaluate venue change request only under “due process standard”;
rather, a court must also evaluate such a motion under the “less stringent” supervisory
powers test); United States v. Moody, 762 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 & n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1991)
(citing Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803-04; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959))
(describing the “supervisory powers” test articulated by the Supreme Court as a “more
exacting fairness standard” on the issue of change of venue).
92
See, e.g., Yount v. Patton, 710 F.2d. 956, 968 (3rd Cir. 1983) (“The petitioner
challenging his state court conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding must shoulder a
particularly heavy burden. Unlike a defendant seeking review of his federal conviction,
the petitioner cannot argue that simply because his jury has read of extra-record facts
with a high potential for prejudice, a federal court must presume that the jury was
prejudiced.”); Moody, 762 F. Supp. at 1485 (“Defendant has made a proper showing
under the established due process standards that there is a reasonable likelihood that
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, and a strong showing under the
Supreme Court’s ‘supervisory standard’ that he is entitled to a change of venue.”); see
also Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798-99 (holding that federal court reviewing a state
conviction on habeas corpus may presume prejudice only in extraordinary cases where
news media influence, inside or outside of the courtroom, “pervaded the proceedings”);
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1953); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476
(1953) (federal conviction reversed under supervisory power); cf. Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 723, 728, 729 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[I]f this case arose in a federal
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have conflated the constitutional and the Rule 21(a) inquiry, without
distinguishing between them.93
The contours of this purported third basis for requesting or
requiring a change of venue in a federal case – the supervisory powers
doctrine – is the most amorphous and perhaps the least understood of the
three legal theories a federal court could rely on to resolve a federal
change of venue question. It is a theory that makes a frequent enough
appearance in the case law to make itself known, but whose viability in
the federal change of venue context is unclear since the Supreme Court
has explicitly refused to develop a supervisory powers fair trial
standard.94 Although courts regularly entertain supervisory doctrine
arguments in the change of venue context, in this writer’s view, better
analysis is that the supervisory doctrine as entirely inapplicable to

court, over which we exercise supervisory powers, I would vote to reverse the judgment
before us. . . . It goes without saying, however, that there is a very significant difference
between matters within the scope of our supervisory power and matters which reach the
level of constitutional dimension.”).
93
See, e.g., United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1523-25 (11th Cir. 1992);
United States v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861, 865 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying the
constitutional due process standard in reviewing and affirming federal conviction);
United States v. Mitchell, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1228 (D. Utah 2010) (“Although the
court’s analysis above relates to the constitutional standard for presumed prejudice, the
court believes many of the same factors are relevant to court’s decision under Rule 21.
The court, therefore, relies on its analysis above for purposes of Rule 21 as well.”);
United States v. Partin, 320 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. La. 1970) (citing the constitutional due
process standard as the test for a pretrial change of venue under Criminal Rule 21(a)
and describing the defendant’s burden under the Rule as “substantial”); United States v.
Kline, 205 F. Supp. 637, 639-40 (D. Minn. 1962) (“I am satisfied from a reading of
these decisions that pre-trial motions for transfers to other Districts for trial under Rule
21(a) should be granted sparingly, in exceptional cases requiring such unusual action,
and then only when it appears with fair certainty that it is unlikely that a fair trial can be
had in the District where the indictment is returned.”); Laurie L. Levenson, Change of
Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1540 (1993)
(“Indeed, if the defendant can show that there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of prejudice
to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the defendant has a constitutional right to a change
of venue. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 codifies this constitutional standard.”).
94
See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“We
believe . . . that it is inappropriate to attempt to formulate a supervisory power standard
for concluding that a fair jury cannot be selected. Except in the most extreme cases, like
Rideau, such a pre-voir dire conclusion must depend solely on the subjective reaction of
the judge who reaches it. Invocation of an appellate court’s supervisory power to
require a continuance or a change of venue, although failure to do so did not constitute a
denial of due process, would therefore introduce additional unguided discretionary linedrawing and consequent uncertainty into the process of litigating controversial cases.”).

ISSUE 18.2

2013

FALL 2013

AN OUNCE OF PRETRIAL PREVENTION

349

federal change of venue motions since a specific rule governs this
particular procedure in federal court. Although federal reviewing courts
may develop and formulate procedural rules to govern matters in federal
courts, they do not have supervisory powers to create rules where a
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure controls the procedure.95 And,
although federal trial courts sometimes refer to their “supervisory
powers,” it would seem that the supervisory powers doctrine cannot
have any relevance at the trial level since, by definition, the supervisory
powers represents the authority of a supervisory (i.e. reviewing) court
over the lower courts to regulate the administration of justice, rather than
a source of trial or lower court authority to resolve issues or cases before
it.96
In any event, considering the case law as a whole, at a minimum,
one can glean a consensus among federal courts regarding the position
of the supervisory powers doctrine in the change of venue rubric vis-àvis the due process and Criminal Rule 21(a) standards. It appears that, if
courts do distinguish among these standards, satisfying the due process
inquiry presents the highest hurdle for a defendant – as noted, this
standard requires a showing of either presumed or actual prejudice. As
further noted, the bar for meeting the presumed prejudice has been set so
high, that it is all but irrelevant on a practical level – the Supreme Court
has only overturned one conviction under the presumed prejudice
standard and only a handful of federal defendants have successfully
moved for a change of venue under the presumed prejudice standard.97
95

See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996) (ruling that trial court does not
have “inherent supervisory power” to grant judgment of acquittal after case has been
sent to jury since such action would contradict plain language of Rule of Criminal
Procedure’s filing limit); see also United States v. McVeigh (McVeigh II), 931 F. Supp.
753, 755 (D. Colo. 1996) (“The Supreme Court has very recently made it clear that a
district court has no authority to depart from the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.”) (citing Carlisle, 517 U.S. 416).
96
See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939) (demonstrating how federal
appellate courts exercise supervisory power over federal district courts in their
administration of the federal criminal laws).
97
United States v. McVeigh (McVeigh III), 153 F.3d 1166, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted) (“[T]o reach a presumption that inflammatory pretrial publicity so
permeated the community as to render impossible the seating of an impartial jury, the
court must find that the publicity in essence displaced the judicial process, thereby
denying the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . However, the bar facing
the defendant wishing to prove presumed prejudice from pretrial publicity is extremely
high.”). Thus, “the claim of presumed prejudice is ‘rarely invoked and only in extreme
situations.’” Id.
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Given this history, it is safe to say that if the presumed prejudice
standard still survives, it hangs on by a slender thread and it is by no
means a viable change of venue theory for most defendants. That leaves
the actual prejudice prong of the constitutional standard, which, as
noted, is also difficult to establish, especially pretrial, given that it is
based on a constitutional post-conviction standard. Further, even if
courts have not agreed on precisely what is required to obtain relief
under Criminal Rule 21(a) and/or the supervisory powers doctrine, it
appears that most federal courts would agree that a federal defendant’s
burden for obtaining a pretrial change of venue under Rule 21(a) should
be less demanding than under the due process post-conviction
standard.98 Thus, it appears federal courts would interpret Criminal Rule
21(a) as imposing the lightest burden on a defendant for obtaining a
pretrial change of venue.99
III. Promoting Preventative Instead of Curative Criminal
Pretrial Relief
As described above, in the discovery context, most federal courts
embrace different standards for evaluating whether evidence requested
pretrial is “material” depending on whether a discovery request is based
on the Criminal Rules or due process guarantees. The reason is that, with
a few exceptions, lower federal courts have concluded that they are
bound by Supreme Court precedent to apply a post-conviction definition

98

United States v. Mitchell, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 (D. Utah 2010) (“Although
Rule 21 adopts the constitutional guarantees of a fair and impartial trial, courts have
recognized that the rule does not require a defendant to meet the same constitutional
standards for a change of venue that a defendant must show in a post-conviction
constitutional attack.” (citing United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. La.
1968))).
99
See United States v. Wright, No. 4:01-CR-03040, 2002 WL 842208, at *10 (D. Neb.
May 3, 2002) (“[I]t would seem that the standard for determining whether a change of
venue is appropriate under this alternate rule is less stringent than the due process
standard.” (discussing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959))); United States
v. Tokars, 839 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1993); United States v. Moody, 762 F. Supp.
1485 (N.D. Ga. 1991); United States v. Engleman, 489 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mo. 1980));
see also United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1224 (8th Cir. 1984) (“A more stringent
standard governs the review of a federal district court’s refusal to grant a change of
venue under Fed. R. Crim.P. 21(a). Appellate evaluation of a denied change of venue
request in a federal prosecution is based on . . . ‘the exercise of [its] supervisory power
to formulate and apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in the
federal courts,’ and not as a matter of constitutional compulsion.” (quoting Murphy v.
Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797 (1975))).
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of “materiality” to pretrial Brady discovery requests irrespective of the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of applying that post-conviction standard
prospectively. At the same time, however, federal courts have had no
trouble concluding that the definition of “materiality” for purposes of
resolving a pretrial discovery motion under Criminal Rule 16(a) is not
co-extensive with the Brady constitutional due process standard. As a
result, federal courts construe the exact same term and concept more
broadly in the pretrial discovery context when the issue arises under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In contrast, although Criminal Rule 21(a) is over sixty years old
and a similar issue of constitutional equivalency recently presented itself
to the Supreme Court in Skilling, there is little consensus about whether
federal courts should construe the terms “prejudice” and “fair and
impartial” trial under Criminal Rule 21(a) consistently with or
differently from the post-conviction due process change of venue
standard. Considering the significant changes that have taken place in
the constitutional due process change of venue jurisprudence since
Criminal Rule 21(a) was adopted, commentators, practitioners, and
federal courts have devoted surprisingly little consideration to Criminal
Rule 21(a) as an alternative, non-constitutional basis for change of
venue in federal cases. Instead, as noted, federal courts have variously
either assumed that Criminal Rule 21(a) and the constitutional standard
are coextensive, treated them as coextensive without offering any
analysis to support this assumption, or simply asserted that Criminal
Rule 21(a) should be interpreted more liberally than the due process
standard without articulating how or why federal courts should do that.
As further noted, apart from Skilling, all of the contemporary change of
venue cases heard by the Supreme Court have arisen from challenges to
state criminal convictions. As a result, most change of venue cases, even
in the federal system, continue to be presented and litigated around a
post-conviction standard developed in the context of federal review of
state court convictions.
Applying a constitutional post-conviction standard to federal
pretrial request for procedural relief is unsound and fails to achieve the
overall goals of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal courts,
consistent with their approach to Criminal Rule 16(a), should interpret
Criminal Rule 21(a) more liberally in the pretrial context for several
reasons. First, as federal courts have noted in the pretrial discovery
context, as a practical matter, it is illogical to attempt to apply a
retrospective standard in a pretrial context and no systemic or
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constitutional interests are served by constraining the pretrial relief
available to a federal defendant by application of a post-conviction
standard. Absent Supreme Court precedent to the contrary (as in the case
with applying the Brady materiality standard pretrial), nothing compels
the lower federal courts to engage in this type of legal fiction. Second,
nothing in the plain language of Criminal Rule 21(a) or its legislative
history compels a conclusion that its operative language should be
interpreted co-extensively with the change of venue due process
standard. Thus, to conclude otherwise risks diminishing the level of
procedural relief available to federal defendants under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure with no practical, jurisprudential or statutory
justification.
A. The Criminal Pretrial Rules Should Not be
Interpreted to Codify Minimal Constitutional PostConviction Review Standards
A federal court’s only inquiry in reviewing a state court
conviction is whether a particular state court procedure or proceeding
fell below a minimum level of constitutional protection guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution in the state court petitioner’s case. This is a review
properly constrained by constitutionally and statutorily mandated
deference to state court proceedings.100 In contrast, a federal appellate
100

Federal circuit courts review federal district court venue rulings on direct review
under a less deferential standard than state court decisions on habeas review. See Goss
v. Nelson, 439 F.3d 621, 627 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Only when a manifest error occurs can
a federal habeas court overturn a state court’s finding regarding jury impartiality as a
whole. This standard also applies to any questions about the impact of pretrial publicity
on the jury pool.” (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984); Swindler v.
Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342, 1347 (8th Cir. 1989))). In contrast, change of venue decisions
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1143 (11th Cir. 2006). Where direct review of
a federal conviction involves a constitutional issue, de novo review applies to an alleged
denial of due process by failing to change venue where presumed prejudice. See
McVeigh III, 153 F.3d at 1179. But see Patton, 467 U.S. at 1050-53 (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (“I believe the Court’s analysis regarding whether a juror has a disqualifying
opinion is flawed. . . . Reynolds and Irvin teach that the question whether a juror has an
opinion that disqualifies is a mixed one of law and fact. Therefore, one cannot apply the
presumption of correctness found in [the federal habeas review statute] because the
statutory language by definition applies only to the factual determinations of state
courts. . . . There is special reason to require independent review [in cases] that arouse[]
the passions of the local community in which an elected judge is required to preside. . . .
Unlike an appointed federal judge with life tenure an elected judge has reason to be
concerned about the community’s reaction to his disposition of highly publicized
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court’s review of a lower federal court proceeding is plenary,
constrained only by federal reviewing courts’ self-imposed standards of
review or by federal statute.101
At the federal appellate review level, the differences between the
purpose and role of the federal court in reviewing a state court
conviction, on one hand, and engaging in direct review of a federal
conviction, on the other hand, are significant enough to warrant different
levels of deference and standards of review.102 At the federal pretrial
juncture, not only are the systemic, policy, statutory, and jurisprudential
reasons underlying the extreme deference federal courts accord a state
court conviction entirely absent, there exists absolutely no justification
for applying any appellate or post-conviction review standard to resolve
a pretrial motion for relief. This is because interests that drive any
appellate standards of direct review, such as deference to trial courts,
institutional stability, and closure are entirely absent when a trial court is
resolving a motion for pretrial relief.
Most importantly, in contrast to the appellate review stage, at the
pretrial stage, a judge is in a position to prevent error prospectively
(unlike an appellate court that is correcting error on review). Thus, the
concerns that inform a trial court’s analysis should be extending a
defendant the greatest procedural protection possible in order to protect
cases.”).
101
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113-114 (1st Cir. 1952) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“[A case involving] a state prosecution was concerned only with the
rock-bottom requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal
historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as ‘due process of
law’ and below which we reach what is really trial by force.” (quoting McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)) (citing Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952))); cf. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) (citations omitted) (“Our
cases dealing with the requirements of voir dire are of two kinds: those that were tried
in federal courts, and are therefore subject to this Court’s supervisory power and those
that were tried in state courts, with respect to which our authority is limited to enforcing
the commands of the United States Constitution.” (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28
(1986); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); Ristaino v. Ross, 424
U.S. 589 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Aldridge v. United
States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931); Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408 (1895)).
102
See Briley v. Bass, 584 F. Supp. 807, 826 (D. Va. 1984) (finding that federal courts
can establish more rigorous standards for their own governance than minimum
constitutional guarantees of fairness imposed on state courts; a federal habeas court
reviewing a state court proceeding must apply latter, less strict, standard).
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his or her constitutional rights prophylactically. By so doing, a trial court
protects systemic interests in the integrity and public perception of
federal criminal court proceedings. A trial court cannot forward these
interests when it imports a post-conviction standard into its resolution of
a pretrial motion if that standard is one that has proven so difficult to
surmount in the post-conviction context that relief is rarely granted
under it.103
This was the point the Sudikoff court made in discussing the
relationship between Rule 16(a) and Brady. That court noted the
significant institutional and systemic differences between the role of a
trial court judge and that of an appellate court as relevant to the question
of what standard a trial court should apply to a pretrial request for relief.
While appellate courts can “ignore” errors that are deemed harmless,
trial courts must not.104 To illustrate the difference in the context of
pretrial materiality, the Sudikoff court used the example of suppression
of evidence pretrial – noting that suppression of evidence could be
“improper” without being prejudicial.105 Thus, although an error may be
harmless from an appellate review perspective, “it is still error.”106

103

See Deal, supra note 29, at 1806-1807 (“This ‘materiality as harmless-error’
analysis links Brady to a host of academic commentary on problems with harmlesserror review. In particular, use of appellate materiality to guide pretrial disclosures, like
harmless error, threatens to separate constitutional rights from remedies. Some
separation is inevitable, since harmless-error review means that remedies are withheld
for ‘harmless’ violations of an accused’s constitutional rights; however, the problem is
exacerbated by the reticence of courts to overturn convictions when an error has
occurred in the trial of a seemingly guilty defendant. Worse, hindsight bias skews
judicial assessments of guilt after conviction: Once courts ‘learn what actually
happened, that outcome seems to have been inevitable all along.’ Thus, while Brady
relies on appellate court decisions to teach prosecutors what evidence they must
disclose, three institutional factors lead appellate courts to underestimate the materiality
of suppressed evidence: (1) the legally prescribed respect for the finality of convictions,
(2) the natural desire to avoid reversing convictions of the guilty, and (3) the
unconscious hindsight bias that makes a defendant’s guilt seem inevitable and
uncontroverted.”).
104
United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
105
Id at 1199.
106
Id.; see also United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Because
the definition of ‘materiality’. . . is a standard articulated in the post-conviction context
for appellate review, it is not the appropriate one for prosecutors to apply during the
pretrial discovery phase.”).
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B. Interpretation of the Criminal Rules Should be
Dictated by the Jurisprudence of Statutory
Construction
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated to
“simplify existing procedure and to eliminate outmoded
technicalities,”107 promote trial economy and efficiency where it can be
achieved without compromising defendants’ fair trial rights,108 “provide
a uniform set of procedures and practices to govern criminal cases in
federal courts consistent with the requirements of justice and sound
administration”,109 expedite criminal appeals,110 prevent wrongful
convictions,111 and achieve an improvement in the administration of
justice similar to that accomplished by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.112 Criminal Rule 2 provides that the Rules are to be
interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal
proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in
administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.113
Criminal Rule 2 “sets forth a principle of interpretation to be used in
construing ambiguous rules, not a principle of law superseding clear
rules that do not achieve the stated objectives.”114
Policy arguments are relevant to interpreting the language of a
Criminal Rule if it is susceptible to more than one meaning.115 However,
“the plain language of the rule supersedes policy arguments; the court
does not have a choice between a liberal approach toward the rule and a
technical interpretation of the rule, when the plain language governs.”116
The same rules of statutory construction that apply to criminal statutes
apply with equal force to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure – the

107

8A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION, supra note 15, § 22:3 (citing United
States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); United States v. Bickford, 168 F.2d 26, 27
(9th Cir. 1948) (explaining that one of purposes of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was to eliminate technicalities)).
108
Id. (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)).
109
Id. (citing United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 715 (2d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Wallace & Tiernan, Inc., 349 F.2d 222, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
110
Id. (citing Gallagher v. United States, 82 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1936)).
111
Id. (citing United States v. Mihalopoulos, 228 F. Supp. 994 (D.D.C. 1964)).
112
Id. (citing United States v. Claus, 5 F.R.D. 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1946)).
113
FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
114
8A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION, supra note 15, § 22:3 (citing Carlisle
v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996)).
115
Id. (citing United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102 (1987)).
116
Id.
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Rules must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant when a
substantial right is involved,117 and any ambiguity in the Rules must be
resolved in the defendant’s favor.118 There is no distinction between the
construction of the rules promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court under congressional authority and other legislation adopted by
Congress itself.119 Thus, the language of the Criminal Rules themselves
must be the starting point for any inquiry as to their scope and
interpretation.120
Criminal Rule 21(a), the specific provision this section focuses
on, provides: the court upon motion of the defendant shall change venue
if the court is satisfied that there exists in the district “so great a
prejudice against the defendant . . . [that he] cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial” in the trial venue.121 The only word in Criminal Rule
21(a) for which the Federal Rules of Criminal Provision provides a
definitive interpretation is “shall.” 122 That leaves a number of key words
and phrases in Criminal Rule 21(a) subject to interpretation. For
example, what does it mean for the court to be “satisfied?” and what is
“so great a prejudice” that will “satisfy” a court that a defendant “cannot
obtain a fair and impartial trial?”
As a threshold matter, there is not a perfect overlap between the
aim of Criminal Rule 21(a) – a fair and impartial trial – and what the
Sixth Amendment guarantees – a trial “by an impartial jury.” Rule 21(a),

117

Id. (citing Kees v. United States, 304 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1962)).
Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 60 F.R.D. 55 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev’d on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1974)).
119
Id. (citing In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury Impaneled January, 1969, 315 F.
Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970)); Rattley v. Irelan, 197 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (finding that
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have the force of statute and therefore abrogate
common-law procedures and principles).
120
Application of these basic rules of statutory construction, in this writer’s view,
should lead to the conclusion that the federal supervisory powers doctrine cannot
provide an independent basis for ordering pretrial relief in the face of a governing Rule.
See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) (finding that the use of the
Court’s supervisory power to create nonconstitutional rules can only be invoked “in the
absence of a relevant Act of Congress”); see also Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1984) (noting that the
opened-ended language of “supervisory power” has prompted courts to apply this
power freely and in a broad array of contexts).
121
FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a)
122
When used in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the word “shall” is
mandatory. United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25, 28 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
118
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by incorporating the phrase “fair and impartial trial,” on its face, is
arguably broader than the Sixth Amendment, which, refers to an
impartial “jury.” As noted in the discussion of the constitutional change
of venue jurisprudence, the primary focus of the standard developed in
that context has been adequacy of trial court efforts to ensure that
prejudicial pretrial publicity has not infiltrated the jury box. The proof
that it hasn’t, of course, lies in the government’s ability to establish that
the trial court ultimately did not seat a juror who demonstrated actual
bias towards the defendant as reflected by the record of voir dire. The
plain language of Criminal Rule 21(a), in contrast, can be read to
incorporate a much wider set of circumstances or events that could
support a change of venue other than juror bias.123
This article has examined how the evolution of the change of
venue due process standard has had a large influence on federal courts’
contemporary interpretation of Criminal Rule 21(a). That does not lead
to a conclusion, however, that Criminal Rule 21(a) incorporated the
federal post-conviction change of venue due process standard. This is
true for the simple reason that enactment of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure predated the Supreme Court cases setting out the due process
standard by almost two decades. Having said that, however, Criminal
Rule 21(a) has been amended subsequent to the development of the due
process standard. Thus, arguably, the Advisory Committee could have
provided clearer guidance as to the interplay and need to differentiate
between the due process standard and Criminal Rule 21(a) after this
issue arose in federal cases had it perceived a need to do so.
In any event, neither the Advisory Committee nor the Supreme
Court has chosen to provide guidance on this issue. Thus, the task of
addressing the issue of whether Criminal Rule 21(a) should be
interpreted co-extensively with the due process change of venue
standard has been left to the lower federal court for resolution on a caseby-case basis. This has turned out to be an experiment with mixed
results. As discussed above, some courts have concluded that Criminal
Rule 21(a) imposes a less stringent standard than the due process
inquiry. However, courts do not always adequately identify the points of
departure between the two or explain how the two differ in application.
Federal courts that have based their reasoning on a textual analysis of

123

For example, in United States v. Engleman, 489 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mo. 1980),
relying on Criminal Rule 21(a), the court relied on prudential considerations such as
efficiency and convenience in deciding to transfer venue prior to voir dire.
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Criminal Rule 21(a) have tended to focus on the certainty that a trial
court should possess to be “satisfied” that the defendant has established
the requisite level of prejudice to obtain relief under Criminal Rule 21(a)
exists. For example, in United States v. Marcello, decided in 1968, after
the Supreme Court articulated the due process standard, the court held
that the standard for a Criminal Rule 21(a) change of venue motion is
“the well-grounded fear that the defendant will not receive a fair and
impartial trial which warrants the application of the rule.”124 Later, in
United States v. Williams, decided in 1975, the court stated that under
the due process standard articulated by the Supreme Court at that time,
“[w]here outside influences affecting the community’s climate of
opinion as to a defendant are inherently suspect,” the test was whether
“the resulting probability of unfairness requires suitable procedural
safeguards, such as change of venue, to assure a fair and impartial
trial.”125 And in United States v. Moody, decided in 1991, the court
articulated the Criminal Rule 21(a) standard to provide that a trial court
must grant a change of venue whenever: (1) the court “is satisfied” of
the existence of great prejudice; (2) outside influences affecting the
community’s opinion as to defendant are “inherently suspect”; (3) there
is “reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent
a fair trial;” or (4) there is “substantial likelihood” a fair trial cannot be
had in the absence of transfer.126
Attempting to distinguish the standard for Criminal Rule 21(a)
from the due process standard based on the level of certainty or
likelihood of prejudice required for a trial court to be “satisfied” that a
level or prejudice warranting a change of venue exists is misplaced for
two reasons. First, the “reasonable likelihood” standard is derived
directly from the Supreme Court’s early articulation of constitutional
due process standard, a standard that the Court jettisoned in later cases.
Second, and more importantly, a “reasonable likelihood” standard has
no relationship to the actual text of Criminal Rule 21(a), and would
seem to contradict it. Criminal Rule 21(a) provides that the trial court
“shall” transfer a case if it is satisfied that the defendant “cannot” obtain
a fair and impartial trial in the charging venue. “Cannot obtain a fair and
124

280 F. Supp. 510, 513 (E.D. La. 1968).
523 F.2d 1203, 1208 (5th Cir. 1975).
126
762 F. Supp. 1485, 1487 (N.D. Ga. 1991); see also United States v. Abrahams, 466
F. Supp. 552, 556-57 (D. Mass. 1978) (finding that defendant established a “likelihood
of prejudicial publicity precluding a fair trial” warranting a change of venue on the
basis of prejudicial pretrial publicity).
125
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impartial trial,” on its face, would seem to impose a more demanding
standard requiring far more certainty of prejudice than a “reasonable
likelihood” of prejudice precluding a fair trial.
A reading faithful to the text of Criminal Rule 21(a) and
consistent with principles of statutory construction would focus instead
on the phrase “so great a prejudice” and would ask how much prejudice
needs to be shown (or even can be shown) in the pretrial context without
the benefit of hindsight and a fully developed trial court record. As
noted, the Supreme Court has defined and constrained the quality and
nature of prejudice that will warrant the reversal of a conviction under
the due process standard to cases in which the defendant can show,
based on the voir dire record, that the trial court seated a juror who was
actually prejudiced against the defendant. Although courts have not
focused on the “prejudice” requirement of Criminal Rule 21(a), there is
no textual or policy reason why interpretation of this term (like the
“materiality” requirement for the federal discovery rules) should be
dictated by the high prejudice bar required to warrant reversal of a
conviction under the due process standard. Furthermore, approaching the
interpretation of Federal Rule 21(a) from this angle gives force to the
maxims of statutory construction that the plain language of a rule must
prevail and that the rules should be construed in favor of the defendant
when a substantial right is involved.
Because a trial court is still in a position to prevent error when
ruling on a motion pretrial, the quality and extent of prejudice to meet
the “so great a prejudice” requirement of Criminal Rule 21(a), should be
relatively light and it should incorporate more than the presumed or
actual juror prejudice showings required under the due process change
of venue standard. On the contrary, it should allow consideration of any
circumstances surrounding a federal trial that could possibly impact both
the defendant’s fair trial rights and the public’s perception of the
impartiality and fairness of the proceeding. This analysis, of course,
must be conducted entirely from a pretrial perspective. Ideally, it would
be undertaken before the trial court engages in voir dire in an effort to
ferret out actual bias in the jury pool, an inquiry relevant to the due
process standard, but not necessarily to the rule-based standard.127 Such
an approach is faithful to the plain language of the rule, places

127

This was the approach the court followed in McVeigh, one of the few contemporary
federal criminal trials in which the defendant successfully moved for a change of venue.
McVeigh II, 931 F. Supp. 753 (D. Colo. 1996).
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responsibility on trial courts to assume a more proactive and
preventative approach at the pretrial stage, and reconciles the postconviction/pretrial standard dilemma that the federal courts have yet to
resolve.
CONCLUSION
Absent a clear indication that Congress intended a specific
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure to provide no more than minimal
constitutional protection to federal defendants, federal courts should
untether the interpretation of individual Criminal Rules from federal
post-conviction constitutional jurisprudence. In the context of defining
“materiality” for purposes of federal discovery, federal courts have
successfully distinguished between pretrial and post-conviction
standards. And, by doing so, they have given trial courts discretion and
authority to act proactively to prevent error pretrial and more effectively
protect federal defendants’ procedural and constitutional rights. Federal
courts should take the same approach to interpreting the level of
prejudice required to warrant a change of venue under Criminal Rule
21(a). Ultimately, construing procedural rules to require federal trial
courts to prevent error, even if it means erring on the side of caution,
forwards the goals of ensuring a fair trial for individual defendants and
promoting public confidence in the federal court system.
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